Scott discovered his domain-theoretic models of the λ-calculus, isomorphic to their function space, in 1969. A natural completeness problem then arises: whether any two terms equal in all Scott models are convertible. There is also an analogous consistency problem: whether every equation between two terms, consistent with the λ-calculus, has a Scott model. We consider such questions for wider sets of sentences and wider classes of models, the pointed (completely) partially-ordered ones. A negative result for a set of sentences shows the impossibility of finding Scott models for that class; a positive result gives evidence that there might be enough Scott models. We find, for example, that the order-extensional pointed ω-cpo models are complete for Π1-sentences with positive matrices, whereas the consistency question for Σ1-sentences with equational matrices depends on the consistency of certain critical sentences asserting the existence of certain functions analogous to the generalized Mal'cev operators first considered in the context of the λ-calculus by Selinger.
Introduction
Scott discovered his remarkable domain-theoretic models of the untyped λ-calculus, more precisely the λβη-calculus, in 1969: see the remarks in [10] and see [12] for further references. Having a class of mathematically interesting models available, a natural completeness problem arises: if two terms are equal in the class, here that of all Scott's models, are they then equal in all models, equivalently, are they βη-convertible? As stated so far, the problem is not quite precise: one should refer to a specific class of models such as all pointed ω-cpos isomorphic to their own function space. This equational completeness problem seems to have appeared first in the literature in [5] ; a positive solution was given in [2] , but with models taken in the category with objects the pointed partial orders with lubs of both increasing ω 0 -and ω 1 -chains, and with morphisms the monotonic functions preserving just the lubs of the increasing ω 1 -chains.
A related problem exists for the λβ-calculus and, e.g., pointed ω-cpos having their own function space as a retract. There is also a natural consistency problem: if an equation is consistent, meaning one cannot use it to derive the equation x = y, does it have a model, e.g., a non-trivial pointed ω-cpo isomorphic to its own function space?
In this paper we consider problems of these kinds for the λ-calculus, various classes of models and various sets of sentences (i.e., closed formulae), not only equations. Here is our general framework. Let T be a first-order theory, e.g., that for combinatory logic, for the λβ-calculus or for the λβη-calculus; let C be a class of models of T ; and let F be a set of sentences. We say that C is F-complete if the following holds:
∀ϕ ∈ F.(∀M ∈ C. M |= ϕ) ⇒ (∀M |= T . M |= ϕ)
and we say that C is F-consistent if the following holds: ∀ϕ ∈ F.(∃M |= T . M |= ϕ) ⇒ (∃M ∈ C. M |= ϕ) As Scott's methods yield models of the λβη-calculus and the λβ-calculus, we are mainly interested in those calculi, but we also discuss combinatory logic. As regards sentences, expanding our interest from equations to first-order sentences is mathematically natural and enables us to take some 'distance' from the hard, unsolved, equational problems but nevertheless try to cast some light on them. As a strategy it has pluses and minuses, making counterexamples easier to find but positive results harder to prove. In this regard we take a standard approach, considering various prenex sets of sentences, and seeking counterexamples of minimal logical complexity and positive results for sentences of maximal logical complexity.
As regards models, we are mainly interested in very general classes, such as those admitting pointed partial orders, or pointed ω-cpos, with corresponding results generally going through for pointed dcpos. Despite their generality, results for these classes do have some bearing on Scott models. On the one hand, negative results apply also to Scott models, as F-completeness or F-consistency for a class of models implies the same for any subclass. On the other hand, positive results can be taken as providing some evidence that Scott models are also complete or consistent in the relevant sense.
Following [6, 1] , one may also look for categorical rather than partially ordered models; it would be interesting to try to extend the results of this paper to such models, cf. [8, Section 3] . Related work appears in [9, 4] . Much of the emphasis there is on a somewhat different question, also generalising the equational completeness question: whether a λ-theory is the theory of a model in a given class of models.
After some technical preliminaries in Section 2, we consider questions of completeness in Section 3, in particular giving Theorem 4, establishing completeness for Π 1 -sentences with positive matrix. Section 4 considers questions of consistency, in particular presenting a reduction of Σ 2 -consistency to the consistency with the λ-calculus of certain nonlinear equations analogous to those holding for generalized Mal'cev operators [11] . The paper concludes with some final remarks in Section 5.
Preliminaries
We refer the reader to Barendregt's book [3] for background information on the λ-calculus and combinatory logic. We generally follow his notation, noting any significant differences where they occur. We consider three first-order theories with equality, T CL , T β and T βη , over the signature with two constants K and S and a binary 'application' operation ·; the application operation is written as an infix, or even omitted entirely, and, whether written explicitly or implicitly, applications are associated to the left. The equational theory of combinatory logic is given by the following two equations:
We take T CL to be given by these two equations together with the sentence K = S, in order to exclude trivial models. Secondly, T β is the extension of T CL by the following three axioms:
(∀z. xz = yz) ⇒ 1x = 1y
where 1 1 = def 1 = def S(KI) and 1 n+1 = def S(K1)(S(K1 n )), and where I is the identity combinator SKK. Thirdly, T βη is the extension of T CL by the following axiom of extensionality: (∀z. xz = yz) ⇒ x = y Models are, as usual, interpretations M = (X, K, S, ·) satisfying the axioms. The theory T CL axiomatises the non-trivial combinatory algebras [3, 5.1.8] ; the theory T β axiomatises the non-trivial λ-models [3, 5.6.3] ; and the theory T βη axiomatises the non-trivial extensional λ-models. We now consider the relation between our theories and combinatory logic and the λ-calculus. It is convenient to allow extra constants. For the theories, one extends the signature with a given set of extra constants, but no further axioms; for the calculi one extends the terms (and, consequently, substitution and conversion) by a given set of constants, in the evident way.
In one direction we translate terms t of T CL (respectively, T β , T βη ) to terms M t of combinatory logic (respectively, the λβ-calculus, the λβη-calculus). In the case of combinatory logic, M t is just t. In the other two cases, application is read as application, K and S as λx.λy.x and λf.λg.λx.f x(gx), and the constants as themselves, and so M t is Barendregt's M λ , see [3, 7.3.1] , extended to handle the constants. We rely on context to tell which of the translations is meant.
In the other direction we translate terms M of combinatory logic (respectively, the λβ-calculus, the λβη-calculus) to terms t M of T CL (respectively, T β , T βη ). In the case of combinatory logic t M is simply M and in the other two cases t M is Barendregt's t CL , see [3, 7.3 .1], extended to handle the constants. We again rely on context to tell which of the translations is meant. We write the Curry abstraction operator applied to a first-order term t and variable x as λ * x.t [3, 5.1] . One has that t = t Mt is provable in the relevant first-order theory and that M and M t M are convertible in the relevant calculus. One further has that M and N are convertible in a given calculus if and only if t M = t N is provable in the corresponding theory and that t = u is provable in a theory if and only if M t and M u are convertible in the relevant calculus. This is trivial for combinatory logic; for the λβ-and the λβη-calculi, one uses the results in [3, 7.3] , extended to handle the constants.
We consider three kinds of equational theory Th. Combinatory logic theories are equational theories extending the above two equations for K and S; one also allows constants in the terms and equations, taken from a given set of constants. For the λβ-calculus one considers λ-theories in the sense of [3] and for the λβη-calculus one considers his λη-theories, allowing additional constants in both cases. We write M = Th N to assert that the equation M = N is in the theory Th (and so = Th is the relation {(M, N )|M = Th N }) and we write CL, λβ and λβη for, respectively, the minimal combinatory logic theory, λ-theory and λη-theory with no constants.
Given an equationally consistent theory Th, i.e., one that does not contain the equation One can also obtain theories from models. Let M be a model of one of our theories which also interprets the given set of constants. Then {M = N | M |= t M = t N } is a consistent equational theory of the corresponding kind.
Our results concern partially-ordered or po models. An interpretation is partially ordered (a po interpretation) if its carrier is a partial order and application is monotone; it is further pointed (a ppo interpretation) if it has a least element, written ⊥. Strictly speaking, po interpretations are not interpretations as they have additional structure: we should rather speak of interpretations admitting a compatible partial order. However the looser way of speaking will not create any difficulties and we continue with it.
A po interpretation of one of our three theories T is a model if it is in the usual firstorder sense. If it is a model of CL one has ⊥·x =⊥. It is natural to consider partiallyordered versions of one of the axioms for 1 and of extensionality. We say that a po interpretation of T β is 1-order-extensional if we have:
and that a po interpretation of T βη is order-extensional if we have:
A ppo interpretation is a pointed cpo (or cppo) interpretation if its carrier is a pointed cpo and application is continuous in both arguments. More precisely, we consider two cases: in the first by cpo we mean ω-cpo where lubs of increasing ω-chains exist and continuity means preserving those lubs; and in the second we mean dcpo where lubs of all directed sets exist and continuity means preserving those lubs. For the most part, our results do not depend on this distinction and so we only make it when needed.
In the cases of T β or T βη we define a retract model to be a cppo that has as a retract the space of its continuous self-maps with application, K and S then given in the usual way; in the case of T βη the retract is then necessarily an isomorphism. Every cppo model of CL has a least-fixed point operator, i.e., an element Y such that Y · x = x n · ⊥: one takes Y to be n≥0 Y (n) , where Y (0) =⊥ and Y (n+1) = SKY (n) . We classify sentences according to quantifier and matrix complexity. By Π n we mean the Π n -sentences, and similarly for Σ n . By Π n (POS) (respectively, Π n (EQ)) we mean those sentences equivalent to a Π n -sentence with positive matrix (respectively, equational matrix), and similarly for Σ n (POS) and Σ n (EQ). By EQ we (evidently) mean Π 0 (EQ), and similarly for POS. As combinatory logic permits pairing, repeated universal or existential quantifiers can be reduced to single ones and conjunctions of equations can be reduced to single equations. Further, when working with T β or T βη , ∀x.t = u is equivalent to λx.t = λx.u, which serves to reduce quantifier complexity for these two theories.
Finally, note that for any set F of sentences, F-consistency is equivalent to Fcompleteness, where F = {¬ϕ | ϕ ∈ F}. We therefore look for counterexamples with positive matrix or, better, equational matrix; we also prefer natural counterexamples. For positive results we can generally do no better than all positive matrices of some prefix class.
Completeness
We begin with two counterexamples to completeness. The first is natural in that it relates to a standard property of fixed-points; the second is, rather, of a technical nature but it applies to a wider class of models of the λ-calculus. Lemma 1 For any combinatory logic or λ-calculus term M and variables f, g / ∈ FV(M ), the terms f (M (gf )) and M (f g) are not convertible. Proof Any reduct of f (M (f f )) has an odd number of f 's, but any reduct of M (f f ) has an even number.
Theorem 1
The cppo models of T CL are not Σ 2 (EQ)-complete and the cppo models of T β or T βη are not Σ 1 (EQ)-complete. Proof Consider the following sentence:
. This holds in every cppo interpretation of CL by the above remark on least-fixed points. However, by Lemma 1, it does not hold for open term models.
The following lemma is immediate from [11]:
Lemma 2 There is a closed term A of the λ-calculus such that the terms:
A(xy)(xy)(xy)(xz) and A(xy)(xz)(xz)(xz) are λβ-convertible, but the terms:
are not λβη-convertible for any non-λβ-convertible terms M, N not containing x as a free variable.
We then have: Theorem 2 The ppo models of T β or T βη are not Σ 1 (EQ)-complete. Proof Consider the following sentence:
By the second part of Lemma 2 this is false in the λβη open term model. However it is true in any ppo model of T β or T βη as we then have for all elements x,z that:
with the last equality holding by the first part of the lemma.
We do not know whether the ppo models of T CL are Σ 2 (EQ)-incomplete, or even, for that matter, whether they are Σ 2 (POS)-incomplete.
We next present some positive results on completeness, now working our way in the opposite direction: from partially ordered models to cpo ones. We consider only the case of T βη in detail, contenting ourselves with remarks on the other two cases as they are very similar. Our method is proof-theoretic: we define a λβη ⊥-calculus, an ordered version of the λβη-calculus with a least element. Its syntax is that of the λ-calculus with an additional constant ⊥. Its axiom system has inequational judgments M ≤ N and the following axioms and rules:
where M = N stands for the conjunction of the judgments M ≤ N and N ≤ M . Note that the order-exensionality rule:
is derivable. A λη⊥-inequational theory Th is a set of inequations M ≤ N between λ-terms, possibly containing ⊥ and other constants from a given set, and closed under the rules and axioms of the λβη⊥-calculus; any such theory is closed under substitution. We write M ≤ Th N to assert that M ≤ N is in Th and M = Th N to assert that M = N is in it, meaning that both M ≤ N and N ≤ M are. Such a theory Th is (inequationally) consistent if x ≤ y is not in it; the set of equations it contains forms a λη-theory, Let λη⊥ be the least λη⊥-inequational theory with ⊥ the only given constant. We seek a characterisation of it in terms of reduction relations. Let → βη be one step of β-or η-reduction; let → ⊥ be the contextual (called compatible in [3] ) closure of the δ-rule ⊥→ M (where M is any term); and let → βη⊥ be their union. 
Conversely, we need to show that the relation between terms M and N of the existence of such an L is closed under the rules and axioms of the λβη⊥-calculus. The only non-obvious matter is transitivity and that is immediate from part 1. (iii) Immediate from part 2.
Theorem 3
The order-extensional ppo models of T βη are Π 1 (POS)-complete. Proof Any sentence in Π 1 (POS) is provably equivalent to a sentence ϕ of the form ∀x. (t 1 = u 1 ∨ . . . ∨ t n = u n ). If true in all order extensional ppo models of T βη , ϕ is, in particular, true in M λη⊥ , and so, assigning [x] to x, we find that M ti = λη⊥ M ui for some i. So, by the last part of Lemma 3, M ti and M ui are βη-convertible. We then have that t i = u i , and so ϕ, is provable in T βη . We conclude that ϕ is valid.
The Π 1 (POS)-completeness of (1-order-extensional) ppo models of T CL or T β is established in much the same way. One introduces CL ⊥ -and λ⊥-inequational theories, proves an analogue of Lemma 3 for the minimal such theories CL ⊥ and λ⊥ and takes the open term model of the corresponding theory.
In order to get similar positive results for the smaller class of ω-cppo models we need a few notions concerning ideals in partial orders.
Definition 1
An ideal in a partial order P is a downwards-closed subset of P ; for any subset X of P we write X↓ for {x ∈ P | ∃y ∈ X. x ≤ y}, the least ideal including X; and for any x ∈ P we write x↓ for {x}↓. An ideal I is directed if it is nonempty and any two elements of the ideal have an upper bound in the ideal; it is denumerably generated if I = X ↓ for some denumerable subset X of I. We write I ω (P ) (respectively I d (P )) for the collection of all denumerably generated directed ideals (respectively all directed ideals) of P , and partially order them by subset; I ω (P ) is an ω-cpo and I d (P ) is a dcpo: both are pointed if, and only if, P is. Now, given a ppo model M = (X, K, S, ·) of T CL , we can define an ω-cppo model I ω (M) of T CL , viz (I ω (X), K↓, S↓, ·) where:
and there is a similar dcppo model I d (M) defined using all directed ideals. Taking a model of the form I ω (M Th ), where Th is a λη⊥-inequational theory, it is not hard to see that the denotation of a term t is [
There is no general reason why either I ω (M) or I d (M) should be order-extensional, even if M is. Fortunately, however, the former is for suitably chosen term models. The extension of a λη ⊥-inequational theory Th by a set of constants C is the least λη ⊥-inequational theory Th(C) which includes Th and whose terms may contain elements of C as constants; it is assumed here that C is a set not containing any constant occurring in a term of Th. It is not hard to show that Th(C) is the set of inequations: 
Theorem 4
The class of order-extensional ω-cppo models of T βη is Π 1 (POS)-complete. Proof If a sentence ∀x. (t 1 = u 1 ∨ . . . ∨ t n = u n ) is true in all order-extensional ω-cppo models then, by Lemma 4, it is true in I ω (M λη⊥(C) ), choosing C to be uncountably infinite. But then, assigning [x]↓ to x, we find that for some i, [M ti ]↓= [M ui ]↓ holds, i.e., that M ti = λη⊥(C) M ui . Using the above characterisation of λη⊥(C) we then have M ti = λη⊥ M ui and so ϕ is valid.
Similar ideal-theoretic methods establish the Π 1 (POS)-completeness of the 1-orderextensional ω-cppo models of T β and of ω-cppo models of T CL . In the latter case one does not have to establish any implication analogous to extensionality and so it is not necessary to take an uncountable supply of constants. For the same reason it is straightforward to obtain the Π 1 (POS)-completeness of dcppo models of T CL using the version of the ideal construction with all directed ideals.
It may be that I ω (M λη⊥ ) is order-extensional: we leave this as an open problem. We also do not know if I d (M λη⊥(C) ), is order-extensional for some set of constants C; if it were then Π 1 (POS)-completeness would also hold for order-extensional dcppo models of T βη . One could, presumably, then establish Π 1 (POS)-completeness for 1-order-extensional dcppo models of T β similarly.
Consistency
We begin by showing the Π 2 (EQ)-inconsistency of proper partially ordered models for all three theories, where a partial order is proper if it contains distinct elements x and y such that x ≤ y. An applicative structure (X, ·) is a set X equipped with a binary operation · termed application; every interpretation of T CL cuts down to such a structure. Definition 2 (i) A subset A of an applicative structure (X, ·) is separable if for each function f : A → X there exists f ∈ X such that f (a) = f · a for all a ∈ A. (ii) An applicative structure (X, ·) is ω-separable if each finite subset of X is separable. It was shown in [8] that there exists an ω-separable model of T βη . Theorem 5 The proper partially ordered models of any of T CL , T β or T βη are not Π 2 (EQ)-consistent. Proof Consider the following sentence:
It is evidently satisfied by any ω-separable applicative structure. On the other hand no applicative structure which admits a proper partial order can satisfy it. For otherwise choose x ≤ y, with x, y distinct. Then there is an f such that f x = y and f y = x and we have y = f x ≤ f y = x, yielding a contradiction.
We now consider Σ 2 (EQ)-consistency for T βη , which is the same as Σ 1 (EQ)-consistency for that theory; we shall return to the other two theories later. As we shall see, whether or not Σ 1 (EQ)-consistency holds depends on the consistency with T βη of the following critical sentences:
where n ≥ 1, m ≥ 2, and a and c respectively abbreviate the lists of variables a 1 , . . . , a n and c 1 , . . . , c m , and Q n,m is the conjunction of the following equations:
. . . a n−1 (λx.cu) = a n (λx.u) a n (λx.cu) = u where, for i = 1, n, we write a i (λx.cu) and a i (λx.u) to abbreviate the respective terms a i (λx.c 1 u) . . . (λx.c m u) and a i (λx.u) . . . (λx.u), the latter with m occurrences of λx.u. Note that no critical sentence ϕ n,m can be satisfied by an order-extensional ppo model. For, if it were, we would have I ≤⊥, as we could calculate, using corresponding abbreviations for ⊥:
= a n (λx.⊥) ≤ a n (λx.c⊥) = ⊥ and it would then follow, for any x, that x = Ix ≤ ⊥x =⊥, contradicting non-triviality. The problem of determining the consistency of a critical sentence ϕ n,m with T βη seems to be very difficult. Substituting fresh constants for the c j , one obtains an equivalent formulation in terms of the consistency with the λβη-calculus of n + 1 equations, and one could then try a Church-Rosser argument. However this method runs into difficulties when, as here, there are non-linear equations: a well-known example is the failure of confluence for the λβ-calculus with surjective pairing [13, 10.4] . On the other hand, neither is there any obvious proof of inconsistency.
A similar situation arises with generalized Mal'cev operators which were first discussed in the context of the λ-calculus by Selinger [11] and whose consideration helped us find the critical sentences; these operators correspond to proper partially ordered models rather than pointed ones. The corresponding critical sentences assert their existence: These equations are also nonlinear and it is not known if any of the µ n are consistent with T CL (it is known that the first two are inconsistent [11] ). There is a connection with our critical sentences that is worth noticing, that T CL µ n ⇒ ψ n,2 .
The discussion now forks into two cases. In the first, let us assume that some critical sentence ϕ n,m is consistent with T βη . In this case, by the above remarks, the orderextensional ppo models are Σ 1 (EQ)-inconsistent for T βη . One further then conjectures, under the same assumption, that substituting Ω1i for a i (1 ≤ i ≤ m) and Ω2j for c j (1 ≤ j ≤ n) in the matrix of the critical formula, the resulting formula ϕ n,m remains consistent (where Ω is (SII)(SII) and k is the kth Church numeral, viz λf.λx.f k x). One sees, as before, that ϕ n,m is not true in any order-extensional ppo model of T β , and so, under this additional assumption one has that the order-extensional ppo models are EQ-inconsistent for T βη . Let us remark, finally, that the discussion here a fortiori also applies to the narrower class of order-extensional cppo models.
We now turn to the second case where all the critical sentences ϕ n,m are inconsistent with T βη aiming to establish Σ 1 (EQ)-consistency. For any λη-theory Th whose terms do not contain the constant ⊥, let Th * be the least λη⊥-inequational theory containing all the equations of Th, and let Th ⊥ be the least λη-theory including Th whose terms may contain ⊥; it is easily verified that it consists of all equations M [⊥/x] = N [⊥/x] where M = Th N and x is any variable.
We next characterise Th * in terms of Th ⊥ and a relation ¢, where M ¢ N holds if and only if for some m ≥ 0, there are terms A, C 1 , . . . , C m such that:
with m (λx. ⊥)'s and:
As will be clear, without loss of generality we can insist that the terms A, C 1 , . . . , C m do not contain ⊥. Also, by adding dummy arguments to A, we can increase m. Lemma 5 (i) The relation ¢ includes ≤ Th ⊥ ; it is closed under application and λ-abstraction; and ⊥ ¢ M holds for all terms M . (ii) The relations ¢ * and ≤ Th * coincide. 
hold, for some terms A, C 1 , . . . , C m and A , C 1 , . . . , C m . We then have:
where A is λu 1 , . . . , u m .λu 1 , . . . , u m Au 1 . . . u m (A u 1 . . . u m ), and so, as desired,
To show closure under λ-abstraction, suppose that M ¢ N so that:
hold, for some terms A, C 1 , . . . , C m . We then have that:
where A is λu 1 , . . . , u m .λy.A(u 1 y) . . . (u m y). But then we have that:
where A is λu 1 , . . . , u m .A ((λy. λx.u 1 [y, x] ) . . . (λyλx.u m [y, x])), and we are using the pairing notation of [3, 6.2] . This shows that, as desired, λy.M ¢ λy.N . (ii) It follows at once from part 1 that ¢ * is a λη⊥-theory including Th. To show it is the least such, let Th be any other. Then if M ¢ N we have:
for some terms A, C 1 , . . . , C m and so M ≤ Th N . This shows that Th includes ¢ and so, as required, ¢ * .
It follows from this lemma that Th * is inequationally consistent if and only if it is not the case that I ¢ * ⊥; for the the next lemma assume that Th is consistent. Lemma 6 If I ¢ * ⊥ then some critical sentence is satisfied by the open term model of Th. Proof By assumption, and adding an extra reflexive link if needed, we have a chain:
for some n ≥ 1. We therefore have an m ≥ 2 and terms A i (i = 1, n) and terms C i,j (i = 1, n, j = 1, m) not containing ⊥ such that:
It follows that:
We need a version of these equations in which the C i,j do not depend on i. To that end define A i (for i = 1, n by: λx 1,1 , . . . , x 1,m , . . . , x n,1 , . . . , x n,m .A 1 x 1,1 , . . . , x 1,m . . . λx 1,1 , . . . , x 1,m , . . . , x n,1 , . . . , x n,m .A n x n,1 , . . . , x n,m 12 take m = def nm and define C k (for k = 1, m ) by setting:
We can then rewrite our equations in the form:
and so the open term model of Th satisfies the critical sentence ϕ n,m , which concludes the proof.
Theorem 6
Suppose that all the critical sentences ϕ n,m are inconsistent with T βη . Then the order-extensional ω-cppo models of T βη are Σ 1 (EQ)-consistent. Proof Let ϕ be a Σ 1 (EQ)-sentence. Without loss of generality, we can take it to be of the form ∃x. t = u. If there is a model of T βη that satisfies it, then there is one of T βη extended by a constant c that satisfies t[c/x] = u[c/x], and there is therefore a consistent λη-theory Th containing the equation
So by the assumption that all the critical sentences ϕ n,m are inconsistent with T βη , we get, using Lemmas 5 and 6, that Th * is inequationally consistent. So M Th * is an orderextensional ppo model of T βη satisfying t[c/x] = u[c/x] and so ϕ. Taking an extension Th * (C) of Th * by uncountably many constants, one further has, by Lemma 4, that I ω (M Th * (C) ) is an order-extensional ω-cppo model of T βη satisfying ϕ.
If, as discussed above, one could establish order-extensionality for directed ideal models one would further have Σ 1 (EQ)-consistency for order-extensional dcppo models under the asme assumption.
Let us now turn to the other two theories. First, in the case of T β , Σ 2 (EQ)-consistency is again the same as Σ 1 (EQ)-consistency, the same critical sentences ϕ n,m serve, and the problem of determining their consistency with T β again seems to be difficult. No critical sentence can be satisfied by an 1-order-extensional ppo model and so, if some critical sentence is consistent we have Σ 1 (EQ)-inconsistency and, under the same assumption, one further conjectures EQ-inconsistency. On the other hand, if every critical sentence is inconsistent with T β one deduces Σ 1 (EQ)-consistency for 1-order-extensional ω-cppo models. The proof is entirely analogous to that of Theorem 6, starting from the λβ⊥-calculus, which is just the λβη⊥-calculus minus η-conversion. Finally, as before, if one could establish 1-order-extensionality for directed ideal models one would also have such consistency for 1-order-extensional dcppo models.
Next, in the case of T CL , one does not have λ-abstraction and the simpler critical sentences:
serve, where n ≥ 1, m ≥ 2, and a and c respectively abbreviate the lists of variables a 1 , . . . , a n and c 1 , . . . , c m , and R n,m is the conjunction of the following equations:
. . . a n−1 (cu) = a n u a n (cu) = u where for i = 1, n, a i (cu) and a i u abbreviate a i (c 1 u) . . . (c m u) and a i u . . . u, respectively, both with m u's. The problem of determining their consistency with T CL may be easier than in the case of the λ-calculus, but, of course, non-linearity remains.
No critical sentence ψ n,m can be satisfied by a ppo model and so, if one were consistent, we would have Σ 2 (EQ)-inconsistency and, under the same assumption, one further conjectures Π 1 (EQ)-inconsistency. On the other hand, assuming every such sentence inconsistent, one deduces Σ 2 (EQ)-consistency for cppo models (both forms of ideal model work). The proof is, as before, entirely analogous to that of Theorem 6, but is simpler as there are no abstractions to consider: the only point is to use the Curry abstraction operator instead, wherever necessary.
Finally, let us consider sentences with positive matrix. We have already established Π 2 (EQ)-inconsistency and Σ 2 (EQ)-inconsistency for all three theories, assuming, in the latter case, that some critical sentence is inconsistent. Assuming instead that every critical sentence is consistent it may nonetheless be that Σ 2 (POS)-or even Π 1 (POS)-inconsistency holds; we leave these as open problems. Note that Σ 1 (POS)-consistency is equivalent to Σ 1 (EQ)-consistency as every Σ 1 (POS) sentence is equivalent to a finite disjunction of Σ 1 (EQ) sentences.
A possible natural counterexample
We give natural Σ 2 (EQ)-sentences (ϕ 4 and ϕ 4 , below) which may provide counterexamples to the Σ 2 (EQ)-consistency, or even the Π 1 (EQ)-consistency of cppo models. Consider the following sentence:
As commuting continuous functions on a cppo have a common fixed-point, this sentence is satisfied by no cppo models of T CL . However, as we now show, it is consistent with T βη . The following result is interesting especially because it answers (negatively) an open question raised more than 25 years ago by Dana Scott, 2 as to whether in a formal λ-theory commuting functions always have a common fixed point. Let Com be the λη-theory with two constants f and g and the equation:
The theory Com is consistent. There is, however, no term M such that f (M ) = Com g(M ). Proof Let δ-reduction, → δ , be the contextual closure of the relation generated by following two rules:
We begin by showing that if M = Com N then we have that M → * βη M → * δ N and N → * βη N for some M and N (the converse is evident). It is enough to show that the relation between M and N of the existence of such an M and N is transitive. To that end, one first shows that an application of a δ-rule "commutes" with one step of β-or η-reduction in the sense that if M → δ N → βη P , then there exists Q such that M → βη Q → n δ P . This is clear for η-reduction. For β-reduction, if the δ-rule has been applied to a subterm of the form f (gP ), then if the β-reduction involves only P the result is trivial, otherwise the whole of the subterm g(f P ) is involved. But then the application of the δ-rule can be postponed, possibly using it more than once. It then immediately follows that if M → * δ N → * βη P , then there exists Q such that M → * βη Q → * δ P . Transitivity follows from this result and the Church-Rosser theorem for the λβη-calculus with extra constants.
We next need to look at δ-reduction in more detail. For any π ∈ {f, g} * , define π ·M recursively for terms M by: Proof Consistency follows from, e.g., a Church-Rosser argument that the stronger theory generated by the equation ΩM N = Ω is consistent with the λβη-calculus. The rest is Lemma 3.1 of [9] , but adapted to the λβη-calculus; the proof is exactly Salibra's, but with the evident additions to account for η-conversion.
Theorem 7
The sentence:
∀x.Ωxx = Ω ∧ Ω = ΩΩ(ΩKI) is consistent with T βη but no ppo model of T CL satisfies it. Proof For the first part note that the equation Ω = ΩΩ(ΩKI) is not in Th. For, if it were, by Lemma 7 we would have, successively that Ω = ΩKI and K = I were too, contradicting the consistency of Th. For the second part, one follows the argument in the proof of Theorem 3.5 of [9] to show that in any ppo model of CL the sentence Ω = ΩΩ(ΩKI) holds.
We therefore have that consistency fails for quantifier-free sentences and ppo models for our two λ-calculus theories T β and T βη , and also that Π 1 -consistency fails for T CL . The formula:
∀x.Ω1xx = Ω1 ∧ Ω2(Ω1) = T ∧ Ω2(Ω1Ω1(Ω1KI)) = F might then provide a counterexample to EQ or Π 1 (EQ)-consistency. The difficulty, as always, is non-linearity, here of the first equation, and it is an open question as to whether the sentence is indeed a counterexample.
In [5] , Honsell and Ronchi Della Rocca give a consistent λ-theory which is not the theory of any retract model. One can extract another example, if of narrower scope, from this work, namely that the following quantifier-free sentence ϕ 5 is consistent with T β but has no retract models: ΩΩ = Ω ∧ λx.Ω(Ωx) = λx.Ωx ∧ λxy.Ω(x(Ωy)Ω)(xΩ(Ωy)) = λxy.Ω(x(Ωy(Ωy)) ∧ Ω = λx.Ω Note that we still have non-linearity. A similar quantifier-free non-linear sentence ϕ 5 can be found using the work of Manzonetto and Salibra [7] ; the sentence in question is to the effect that Ω is a central element in their sense that differs from both T and F.
Concluding Remarks
Considering just the λβη-calculus, an interesting example of a Σ 2 -sentence true in all retract models but not in every model is the following: In fact, in any retract model (X, K, S, ·) the function:
x ∈ X → if x ≤ a then ⊥ else a where a is any element of the model different from the bottom element is continuous, hence representable. So each retract model satisfies ϕ 6 . On the other hand, as shown in [3] , the open term model of λβη satisfies the range property, whereby the range of any term is either infinite or else the term denotes a constant, so falsifying ϕ 6 . The question whether there is an order-extensional ppo, or even cppo, model which satisfies the range property remains open.
One can relativize the basic notions of this paper. Given two classes of models C ⊆ C of a theory T and a set of sentences F, one can enquire if C is F-complete or F-consistent relative to C . As an example, the directed ideal constructions show that cppo models of T CL are consistent relative to ppo models for Σ 2 (POS). This may fail for Σ 2 ; the sentence ϕ 4 would provide a counterexample if one could show, for example, that Proposition 1 held for Com * , the least λ⊥-inequational theory including Com. Another such question is whether one can separate the cppo models from the retract ones. For example, assuming that all the critical sentences ϕ n,m are inconsistent with T β , are the retract models quantifier-free-consistent relative to the order-extensional ω-cppo models of T β ? One of the sentences ϕ 5 or ϕ 5 may provide a counterexample.
